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ARTICLES

Anatomy of the Reasonable Observer
B. Jessie Hill†
INTRODUCTION
Pity the reasonable observer. This hypothetical person,
referenced primarily in establishment clause cases as the
imaginary arbiter of whether a government-sponsored display
or practice constitutes an endorsement of religion, has been
criticized and maligned—his very existence questioned.1 While
the reasonable observer has, so far, survived these attacks,
some commentators suggest that he is not long for this world.2
And a small cottage industry exists to point out the reasonable
observer’s shortcomings, as well as to propose alternatives to
this heuristic device.3

† Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Research,
and Laura B. Chisolm Distinguished Research Scholar, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law. Early drafts of this paper were presented at the BYU Law
and Religion Colloquium and the Annual Law and Religion Roundtable at Stanford
Law School. The author thanks the participants in those workshops for helpful
criticisms and suggestions, especially Fred Gedicks, Cole Durham, Ron Colombo, Frank
Ravitch, Bill Marshall, and Nelson Tebbe.
1 Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s
Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1335 (2011) (“There is no unique reasonable
observer.”); Paula Abrams, The Reasonable Believer: Faith, Formalism, and the
Endorsement of Religion, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1537, 1539 (2010) (describing the
reasonable observer as “no more than an empty suit”).
2 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of Constitutional Law, 34 CAP. U. L. REV.
647, 665-66 (2006); Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Lessons for Religious Liberty Litigation
from Kentucky, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 275, 302 (2013) (noting that
many believe the Supreme Court may soon depart from its current doctrinal
framework toward one that is more “pro-religion”).
3 See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable
Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1574 (2010) (advocating for a “reasonable
religious outsider’s perspective” in evaluating the constitutionality of ceremonial
deism); Dorf, supra note 1, at 1337 (tentatively advocating a “qualified victim
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Does all of this spell the demise of the reasonable
observer? The status of the endorsement test, with which the
reasonable observer is most closely associated, has been in
question at least since Justice Sandra Day O’Connor left the
Supreme Court, and probably well before that. Recent cases
such as Town of Greece v. Galloway, in which the Second
Circuit struck down a town’s legislative prayer practice
because “it constituted an endorsement of Christianity from the
perspective of ‘an ordinary, reasonable observer,’” raise the
possibility that the Court will soon reconsider the endorsement
test and possibly decide to abandon it entirely.4
Much of the resistance to the endorsement test arises from
disagreement with its underlying substantive assumption—
namely, that mere endorsement of religion by the government is
unconstitutional.5 However, the notion that the social meaning of
a government practice—determined from the perspective of a
“reasonable observer”—is relevant to its constitutionality has
significantly more traction within constitutional doctrine.6
Indeed, even if the Court were to replace the endorsement test
with the test preferred by the Court’s conservative wing, a
“coercion” or “proselytization” test, it must still determine
whether the official religious speech was in fact coercive or
proselytizing.7 Presumably, this determination would have to be
made from the perspective of a reasonable or objective observer.
There is therefore reason to believe that the reasonable
observer would survive the death of the endorsement test.
perspective” for identifying social meaning); Norman Dorsen & Charles Sims, The
Nativity Scene Case: An Error of Judgment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 837, 859-61.
4 Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, No. 12696, 2014 WL 1757828 (May 5, 2014). In deciding the case, the Supreme Court’s analysis
made only passing reference to the reasonable observer test in a portion of the opinion
representing only three justices. Town of Greece v. Galloway, No. 12-696, 2014 WL
1757828, at *14 (May 5, 2014). In contrast, a concurrence authored by Justice Thomas
and joined by Justice Scalia overtly rejected the use of the reasonable observer. Id. at *26
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]hatever nonestablishment principles existed in 1868, they
included no concern for the finer sensibilities of the ‘reasonable observer.’”).
5 See,
e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What’s Right and Wrong with “No
Endorsement”, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 307, 315-16 (2006); Steven D. Smith, Symbols,
Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No
Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 302-03 (1987).
6 See infra Part I.B. “Social meaning” may be defined as “the semiotic content
attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular context.”
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 (1995).
7 A “coercion” or “proselytization” test would recognize establishment clause
violations only where the government has coerced someone to engage in a religious
practice or has engaged in proselytizing speech. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 587 (1992); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-60 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Scholars have recognized the importance of social meaning in
other domains of constitutional law and have begun to apply
the concept of social meaning more broadly.8 Recent articles
have applied an analysis of social meaning to domains of
constitutional law reaching beyond the establishment clause,
including same-sex marriage and affirmative action.9 They
have also suggested the relevance of the reasonable observer
heuristic to the much-discussed doctrine of government
speech.10 There is, therefore, a particularly acute need to
understand how social meaning is conveyed and from whose
perspective it is judged. In other words, so long as the expressive
content of government action has legal and constitutional
significance, the reasonable observer remains relevant as one
possible answer to the question, “Whose meaning counts?”11 And
if the spate of recent scholarship on the issue of government
speech12 and related expressive concerns13 is any indication, that
significance is waxing rather than waning.
Yet, the reasonable observer heuristic is also highly
problematic. Critics have taken issue with this interpretive
device, arguing that it is an overly idealized construct that fails
to capture the way real people actually view a religious display.
In particular, two powerful critiques have been advanced time
and again. First, critics point out that the level of knowledge
imputed to the reasonable observer is greater than that of the
See infra Part I.B.
William M. Carter, Jr., Affirmative Action as Government Speech, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 2 (2011); Dorf, supra note 1; Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98
MINN. L. REV. 648 (2013).
10 See infra Part I.B.
11 Cf. William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It” The Supreme Court
and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 534-36 (1986) (asking, with respect to
religious symbols, “Whose perspective (and perception) should govern?”).
12 E.g., Joseph Blocher, Government Property and Government Speech, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1413 (2011); Carter, supra note 9; Caroline Mala Corbin,
Nonbelievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L. REV. 347 (2012); Claudia E. Haupt,
Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, 85 TUL. L. REV. 571 (2011);
B. Jessie Hill, (Dis)Owning Religious Speech, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 361 (2013); Helen
Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 587 (2008); Tebbe, supra note 9. The Case Western Reserve Law Review, the South
Dakota Law Review, and the Denver University Law Review recently published
symposia on government speech. Symposium, Government Speech: The Government’s
Ability to Compel and Restrict Speech, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1081 (2011);
Symposium, Government Speech, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 809 (2010); Symposium,
Government Speech Doctrine, 57 S.D. L. REV. 389 (2012).
13 Dorf, supra note 1. In 1992, Professor Kenneth Karst suggested that while
the salience of disputes over material goods, like resource allocation among religious
groups, has dissipated, “[i]ssues concerning governmental deployments of the symbols
of religion . . . have a far greater capacity to polarize.” Kenneth L. Karst, The First
Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 503, 507 (1992).
8
9
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average viewer and is therefore unrealistic.14 Second, critics
argue that the reasonable observer inquiry is so unguided and
standardless that the reasonable observer essentially becomes
a stand-in for the judge and her personal predilections—
especially when one considers the unusually high degree of
knowledge imputed to the reasonable observer.15 This critique
usually also posits that the judge is likely to be biased in favor
of upholding majority religious symbols, reflecting the fact that
most judges are Christian and are therefore less likely to view
Christian symbols as an endorsement.16
This article argues that the critiques of the reasonable
observer heuristic are misguided and that the various
alternatives to the reasonable observer that grow out of this
critique are both unnecessary and unworkable. In particular, I
argue that commentators have misunderstood both the
reasonable observer heuristic and alternatives like the
reasonable religious outsider. Those commentators have
assumed that the judge must put herself in the shoes of a
stranger with certain characteristics and then consider the
challenged religious display or practice from that perspective.
This conception is fundamentally incorrect. Understood
in the most useful way possible, the reasonable observer is an
accurate model for making sense of the process of interpreting
social meaning. When an interpreter engages in discerning the
meaning of something—whether a text or a symbolic display—
she considers as much information as she has available: the
context, the background, and the relevant social facts, as well as
the words or symbols themselves. She then uses this information
to reconstruct the intent, or purpose, behind the symbolic
representation. This reconstructed intent, I argue, is essentially
synonymous with “social meaning.” The reasonable observer is,
then, simply a reader of social meaning, and the reasonable
observer’s role in discerning the meaning of religious symbolism
should not be controversial or suspect.
Still, one problem with this understanding of the
reasonable observer is that it fails to address the heuristic’s
majoritarianism critique. It is undeniable that two people can
view a symbol and reach different conclusions about its
meaning, even if both have the same background knowledge
about it. Assuming that one’s religious background and beliefs
14
15
16

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
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are likely to affect perception, it is difficult to say whose
understanding should be the one that matters under the
establishment clause.17 And one might fear that symbols and
practices will be understood as less problematic when they
reflect the expectations and cultural background of judges,
many of whom are white, male, and Christian. Thus, the
reasonable observer still risks embodying an overwhelming
majoritarian bias when used to interpret social meaning. This
line of argument leads to the suggestion that judges should
instead adopt the perspective of the religious outsider, so that
minority group interests are sufficiently protected.
I contend that this “outsider” solution does not actually
advance the ball on opening up social meaning to minority
perspectives. There are certainly problems with the reasonable
observer: most importantly, there is nothing that requires
judges to choose the social meaning that favors the religious
outsider over the religious insider (or, for that matter, vice
versa).18 The inquiry into social meaning by judges is almost
completely unconstrained by legal rules. Yet, proposals to
require judges to adopt the perspective of the reasonable
religious outsider do not solve these problems because they
merely ask judges to engage in acts of empathy—of
identification with another hypothetical person—for which they
are likely ill-equipped. Indeed, many people, not just judges,
are uncomfortable and incompetent at seeing the world
through another’s eyes, and there is no guarantee that judges,
in particular, will execute this task very well. Instead, I
propose that judges should use legal devices of the sort that
judges are more comfortable with—in particular, rebuttable
presumptions and burdens of proof—to force the consideration
of social meaning from something other than a majoritarian
perspective. Judges are competent at using such devices, and
parties will frame their arguments accordingly. Though not
without its flaws, this proposal will better protect minority
viewpoints than the various “alternative observers” that have

17 See, e.g., Mark Strasser, The Protection and Alienation of Religious
Minorities: On the Evolution of the Endorsement Test, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 67576, 707. As noted below, however, this assumption may be somewhat more
questionable than it appears. See infra Part II.B.2.
18 Strasser, supra note 17, at 676 (“Justice O’Connor understands that
individuals with access to the same information will nonetheless reach different
conclusions. However, she says nothing about how to determine who has accurately
described the message the state intends to convey, even though such a determination is
the central concern of the purpose prong.”).
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been proposed. In addition, it may give the social meaning
inquiry some greatly needed structure.
In Part I, I briefly review the genesis of the reasonable
observer in relation to the endorsement test, the predominant
test for analyzing challenges to public displays of religious
symbols. I also describe various other constitutional contexts in
which social meaning is implicated and how the reasonable
observer heuristic is therefore relevant. In Part II, I outline the
standard critiques of the reasonable observer as well as some
proposals for replacing it with a different, more minorityfocused observer. Then, in Part III, I set forth my own critique:
that the standard criticisms of the reasonable observer are
based on a misunderstanding of that heuristic device and that,
while well-meaning, the suggested alternatives are also
fundamentally wrongheaded. I conclude that both religious
minorities and judges would be better served by a jurisprudence
that uses more standard legal devices, such as presumptions
and burden-shifting, rather than one that demands judges
develop a sympathetic imagination.19 Legal constraints, rather
than legal fictions,20 are sorely needed.
I.

A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF THE REASONABLE OBSERVER

A burgeoning body of scholarship recognizes the
constitutional relevance of the social meaning conveyed by
expressive governmental actions in a variety of contexts, ranging
from flying the confederate flag to outlawing same-sex marriage.
At the heart of most of this scholarship is an assumption that
the perspective of the reasonable observer is the one from which
social meaning will be judged. It is therefore important to
understand the origin of the reasonable observer and its role as
a heuristic device for making sense of the social meaning
inquiry. Its origin can be traced to the endorsement test in
establishment clause jurisprudence, but the influence of the
reasonable observer has extended far beyond that context.

19 Although this article focuses primarily on the use of the reasonable
observer heuristic in the establishment clause context, where it is most developed
doctrinally, its application may stretch to other contexts where social meaning is
constitutionally relevant.
20 Cf. Capitol Square Rev. & Adv. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 800 n.5 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing Justice O’Connor’s version of the reasonable
observer as a “legal fiction”); Abrams, supra note 1, at 1538 (describing the reasonable
observer as a “legal fiction”).
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The Rise of the Reasonable Observer

Although he did not appear on the scene until later, the
stage was set for the reasonable observer in Lynch v.
Donnelly.21 This 1984 Supreme Court case involved a challenge
under the establishment clause of the First Amendment22 to a
nativity scene display at Christmastime in downtown
Pawtucket, Rhode Island. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Burger applied the test derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman23 and
held the display to be constitutional. Burger’s opinion described
the display as an acceptable acknowledgement of religion, no
more problematic than “the Congressional and Executive
recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as ‘Christ’s Mass,’
or the exhibition of literally hundreds of religious paintings in
governmentally supported museums.”24 The opinion was rather
thin on analysis, however, and Justice O’Connor’s brief concurrence
therefore assumed particular importance.25 In her opinion, Justice
O’Connor stated that the relevant inquiry was “whether Pawtucket
has endorsed Christianity by its display of the crèche.” In other
words, she explained, the Court must consider whether the
challenged display “sen[t] a message to nonadherents that they
[were] outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
an accompanying message to adherents that they [were] insiders,
favored members of the political community.”26
Justice O’Connor offered her “endorsement test” as a
gloss on the Lemon test, an overlay that focused the Lemon test
on the social meaning of the governmental practice in question.
Justice O’Connor did not specifically mention or describe the
reasonable observer in that early case. Indeed, Justice
O’Connor focused primarily on the overall substantive goal of
the endorsement test—namely, to ensure that government
would not promote messages that designated some individuals
as second-class citizens on the basis of religion.27 She made only
passing, generic references to the “audience” and “viewers” of
religious displays.28 At the same time, she laid the groundwork
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .”).
23 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
24 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
25 Cf. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (noting that “[t]he
rationale of the majority opinion in Lynch is none too clear” and “offers no discernible
measure for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible endorsements”).
26 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688, 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
27 Id. at 691-92.
28 Id. at 690, 692.
21

22
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for the reasonable observer in a way that reflects a proper
understanding of how meaning is conveyed and interpreted.
Specifically, Justice O’Connor explained:
The meaning of a statement to its audience depends both on the
intention of the speaker and on the “objective” meaning of the
statement in the community. Some listeners need not rely solely on
the words themselves in discerning the speaker’s intent: they can
judge the intent by, for example, examining the context of the
statement or asking questions of the speaker. Other listeners do not
have or will not seek access to such evidence of intent. They will rely
instead on the words themselves; for them the message actually
conveyed may be something not actually intended. If the audience is
large, as it always is when government “speaks” by word or deed,
some portion of the audience will inevitably receive a message
determined by the “objective” content of the statement, and some
portion will inevitably receive the intended message.29

Justice O’Connor’s explanation demonstrates a
sensitivity to the way in which interpretation occurs. For
example, interpretation draws upon both subjective
components—particularly the speaker’s intent—and objective
components—specifically, the context of the speech. Indeed,
Justice O’Connor treats the holiday display almost as though it
were a straightforward linguistic communication by a
government actor. Finally, drawing on the context, Justice
O’Connor concluded, rather controversially, that “the overall
holiday setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to
be the purpose of the display . . . [and] negates any message of
endorsement of that content.”30
In subsequent cases—most notably, Wallace v. Jaffree31
and County of Allegheny v. ACLU,32 the Court largely embraced
and further refined the endorsement test.33 Justice O’Connor,
in her concurrences, put forth the reasonable observer
perspective as the relevant viewpoint for discerning whether a
government practice endorses religion. In Jaffree, the Court
struck down Alabama’s moment-of-silence law because it was
enacted “for the sole purpose of expressing the State’s
endorsement of prayer . . . .”34 In her concurrence, Justice
O’Connor took the opportunity to expand on the endorsement
test. Regarding the challenge to the moment-of-silence law, she
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 690.
Id. at 692.
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56-61; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601-02.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 60.
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explained that “[t]he relevant issue is whether an objective
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state
endorsement of prayer in public schools.”35 Similarly, in
Allegheny, a challenge to both a crèche display and a menorah
display in and around public buildings, a majority of the
justices applied the endorsement test, though not all in one
opinion.36 Appearing to equivocate about whose perspective was
relevant, Justice Blackmun, writing only for himself, declared
that the Court “must take into account the perspective of one
who is neither Christian nor Jewish, as well as of those who
adhere to either of these religions,” as well as the perspective of
“a ‘reasonable observer.’”37 Concurring, Justice O’Connor
(joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens) clarified that the
relevant perspective is that of the “reasonable observer.”38
But the most extensive discussion of, and debate over,
the reasonable observer occurs in Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette,39 a case dealing with a free speech
challenge to a city’s decision to exclude a Ku Klux Klan-sponsored
Latin cross from a public forum. The city claimed it was excluding
the cross not because it objected to the Klan’s racist political
message, but because the city feared it would be committing an
establishment clause violation if it allowed the cross to stand.40
The primary issue before the Supreme Court, therefore, was
whether the establishment clause would be violated if the city
allowed the display of the freestanding cross in a statesponsored public forum.41 Enter the reasonable observer.
No consistent picture of the reasonable observer emerges
from the case. Justice Scalia, writing for a four-justice plurality,
favored a per se rule that no inference of governmental
endorsement of religion can arise from allowing private religious
speech in a true public forum. Since Capitol Square was a public
forum, the plurality’s rule rendered the reasonable observer an

35 Id. at 76 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Witters v. Wash.
Dep’t Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (referring to
the “reasonable observer”). Although the terms “objective” and “reasonable” are not precisely
synonymous, the Court seems to use the terms “objective observer” and “reasonable
observer” interchangeably. This article therefore does not distinguish them, either.
36 See B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic
Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 497 (2005).
37 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
38 Id. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
39 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
40 Id. at 758-59 (plurality opinion).
41 Id. at 757.
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irrelevancy.42 Several of the remaining justices debated what level
of knowledge should be attributed to the reasonable observer.
Justice O’Connor presented an image of the reasonable
observer as an omniscient representative of the entire
community. Her concurrence argued that the reasonable
observer is “aware of the history and context of the community
and forum in which the religious display appears.”43 Specifically,
Justice O’Connor continued, this awareness includes “knowledge
that the cross is a religious symbol, that Capitol Square is owned
by the State, and that the large building nearby is the seat of
state government.”44 In addition, the test assumes the reasonable
observer’s familiarity with “the general history of the place in
which the cross is displayed” as an open forum for private
speech—in other words, the reasonable observer would recognize
“how the public space in question has been used in the past.”45
Justice O’Connor also analogized the reasonable observer to the
“reasonable person” in tort law—not a real, ordinary individual,
but “a community ideal of reasonable behavior” and a
representative of “[collective] social judgment.”46
Justice O’Connor’s view in Pinette resonates with her
later concurrence in Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow,47 the Pledge of Allegiance case. In Elk Grove,
O’Connor elaborated on the reasons for the reasonable observer
heuristic.48 First, the objective nature of the observer’s viewpoint
ensures that an unreasonable or marginal perspective will not act
as a “heckler’s veto” over religious speech that the overwhelming
majority of people would not consider to be endorsing religion.49
And second, being a representative of rational, social judgment,
“aware of the history of the conduct in question, and . . . its place
in our Nation’s cultural landscape,” the reasonable observer is
particularly well-positioned to discern the social meaning of a
particular government practice and the impact of that practice
on outsiders’ political standing.50
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Pinette, by contrast,
emphasized that the reasonable observer’s perspective should
embody an individual whose religious viewpoint is not
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 770.
Id. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 780-81.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 779-80 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
542 U.S. 1 (2004).
Id. at 34-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 35.
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represented by the challenged symbol.51 Justice Stevens
criticized Justice O’Connor’s version of the reasonable observer
for ignoring the reality that different people may reasonably
infer different messages from the same display and for asking
far too much of the “reasonable” viewer of a religious display.
According to Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor’s “reasonable
observer” is more like a “well-schooled jurist,” an “‘ideal’
observer” and even “prescient” enough to have a sophisticated
sense of the development of legal doctrine.52 Arguing that
Justice O’Connor’s reasonable observer has an unreasonably
high level of legal and historical knowledge, Justice Stevens
stated, “Many (probably most) reasonable people do not know
the difference between a ‘public forum,’ a ‘limited public forum,’
and a ‘non-public forum.’ They do know the difference between
a state capitol and a church.”53
Though the debate over his predominant qualities
remains unresolved, the reasonable observer continues to
appear in Supreme Court cases.54 Several of the justices, for
example, called on the reasonable observer in Salazar v. Buono,55
a challenge to a Latin cross war memorial that originally stood on
a portion of federal land but was subsequently transferred, along
with the land, to private ownership.56 The Court also referred to
the reasonable observer and the endorsement test in its decision
upholding the Cleveland, Ohio school voucher system.57
Sooner or later, it seems, the Supreme Court is likely to
revise its jurisprudence on the reasonable observer. Over
vociferous dissents, the Court recently denied certiorari in two
cases applying the endorsement test to religious symbols. In
Utah Highway Patrol Association v. American Atheists, Justice
Thomas’s dissent from the denial of certiorari criticized the
endorsement test for the confusion it has engendered over the
nature and qualities of the “reasonable observer.”58 In that
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 800 n.5, 802 n.7.
53 Id. at 807.
54 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 487 (2009) (Souter, J.,
concurring); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 707, 718 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); cf. Summum, 555 U.S. at 474-75 (majority opinion) (discussing how
different observers might perceive a monument).
55 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
56 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion questioned the relevance of the
reasonable observer but proceeded to apply the test. Id. at 1819-20; see also id. at 1824
(Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1832-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 654-55 (2002).
58 Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 20-21
(2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
51
52
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case, the court below had altogether failed to reach consensus
on how the reasonable observer would perceive the challenged
practice of marking the deaths of highway patrol officers with
Latin crosses bearing the seal of the Utah Highway Patrol.
Justice Thomas attributed this discord to the reasonable
observer heuristic, which, to him, required “erratic, selective
analysis of the constitutionality of religious imagery on
government property,” essentially driven by “the personal
preferences of judges.”59 Mount Soledad Memorial Association
v. Trunk, in which the lower court held a war memorial in the
form of a Latin cross on federal land to be unconstitutional
under the endorsement test, provoked similar reflections from
Justice Alito when the Court denied certiorari.60 Agreeing that
certiorari should be denied, Justice Alito nonetheless emphasized
that the “Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
undoubtedly in need of clarity.”61 Moreover, the Second Circuit
recently applied the reasonable observer test to a legislative prayer
case, Galloway v. Town of Greece, which the Supreme Court
reversed in 2014.62 The unresolved difficulties surrounding the
endorsement test and the identity of the reasonable observer are
therefore particularly pressing and salient.
B.

The Reasonable Observer outside the Establishment
Clause Context

While some have suggested that the endorsement test’s
days are numbered in the establishment clause context,63 the
reasonable observer’s influence nonetheless seems to have
spread to other legal contexts. For example, in the closely
related doctrine of “government speech” under the free speech
clause of the First Amendment, commentators have argued and
judges have held that the question of whether particular speech
may be attributed to the government should be judged from the
Id. at 21.
132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012) (Alito, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
61 Id. at 2535.
62 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, No. 12-696, 2014 WL 1757828 (May 5, 2014).
63 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of Constitutional Law, 34 CAP.
U. L. REV. 647, 665 (2006) (noting that there are five votes on the Court in favor of
adopting a “coercion” test in place of the endorsement test); Gary J. Simson, Beyond
Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 313,
379-81 (2006). But see Mark Strasser, The Endorsement Test Is Alive and Well: A Cause
for Celebration and Sorrow, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1273, 1314 (2013) (“Commentators have
suggested that the endorsement test may have retired along with Justice O’Connor.
That suggestion does not seem plausible if only because members of the Court continue
to invoke the test.” (footnotes omitted)).
59
60
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perspective of the reasonable observer.64 If the endorsement test is
on the wane, the government speech doctrine—according to which
speech is immunized from free speech clause challenges if it is
attributable to the government—is clearly growing in influence
and importance. Its application has ranged from questions
concerning the constitutionality of excluding particular
religious displays from public parks,65 to permissible viewpointlimitations on specialty license plate programs,66 to prohibitions
on funding for women’s health services providers,67 to allowable
sanctions for speech by government employees and even public
school cheerleaders.68 There is thus reason to think that the
reasonable observer will remain relevant to constitutional
doctrine, whether or not the endorsement test continues to apply
in establishment clause cases.69
Moreover, the reasonable observer has begun to make
appearances outside the First Amendment context. For
example, Professor Michael Dorf persuasively argues that the
Constitution bans governmental messages that designate some
individuals, groups, or relationships as inferior to others.70 In
so doing, Dorf not only makes the case for recognizing
“expressive” harm as a constitutionally cognizable harm, but also
grapples with the difficult problem—present in religious symbolism
cases—of “discerning, or more properly, . . . constructing, social
meaning” in cases where it may be disputed.71 Rejecting the
64 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 487 (2009) (Souter,
J., concurring); Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding the relevant
question in identifying governmental speech to be “whether, under all the circumstances,
a reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be the
government or a private party”); Joseph Blocher, Government Property and Government
Speech, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1413, 1465-69 (2011); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed
Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 627-28
(2008); Carl G. DeNigris, When Leviathan Speaks: Reining in the Government-Speech
Doctrine Through a New and Restrictive Approach, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 133, 159-60 (2010).
65 Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
66 ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006).
67 Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo Cnty. Texas, Inc. v. Suehs, 692 F.3d
343, 349-50 (5th Cir. 2012).
68 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-23 (2006) (government employee
speech); Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x. 852 (5th Cir. 2010).
69 Indeed, in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787, 2014 WL 1343625 (Apr. 7, 2014), the New Mexico
Supreme Court employed the perspective of the “reasonable observer” in considering a
photographer’s claim that she would be sending a message of endorsement of same-sex
relationships, in contravention of her religious principles and her free speech rights, if
she agreed to photograph a same sex commitment ceremony. Id. at 69 (“Reasonable
observers are unlikely to interpret Elane Photography’s photographs as an
endorsement of the photographed events.”).
70 Dorf, supra note 1, at 1275 (asserting that “the Constitution forbids government
acts, statements, and symbols that label some persons or relationships as second-class”).
71 Id. at 1278, 1315-46.
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reasonable observer approach as too indeterminate, Dorf, like other
critics of the reasonable observer discussed below, advocates for
a variation on that test—the “reasonable victim” perspective.72
Along similar lines, Professor Helen Norton has
explored the intersection of government speech and equal
protection jurisprudence and argues that, in its current state,
the doctrine is insufficiently protective against the unique
harms that may arise from discriminatory or hateful
governmental messages.73 Norton, too, explicitly draws upon
the reasonable observer framework from the establishment
clause cases to suggest how social meaning can be discerned for
purposes of making constitutional claims.74
Similarly, Professor Nelson Tebbe argues in a recent
article that government actions outside the religious speech
context should, like religious speech, be constitutionally
constrained by a nonendorsement principle.75 Drawing on
examples from the realms of equal protection, electioneering,
political gerrymandering, and due process, Tebbe contends that
the social meaning of government actions may have constitutional
implications in a wider variety of cases than courts and scholars
have acknowledged.76 In so arguing, Tebbe suggests that the
perspective of the reasonable or objective observer may be used to
discern both whether the government is speaking through its
actions and what the government is saying.77
These recent articles echo earlier, more general
discussions of the expressive thread of equal protection.78 As
many scholars have observed, concerns about government
messages of inferiority have been at the heart of at least one
strain of equal protection doctrine, stretching from Plessy v.
Ferguson, to Brown v. Board of Education, to Shaw v. Reno.79
In addition, Professor Richard Primus has considered the
expressive dimensions of disparate impact doctrine under Title
72 Id. at 1334-38 (modifying the reasonable observer approach to take account
of the “qualified victim perspective”).
73 Helen Norton, The Equal Protection Implications of Government’s Hateful
Speech, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159, 209 (2012).
74 Id. at 199-202.
75 Tebbe, supra note 9.
76 Id. at 657-92.
77 Id. at 694.
78 Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (2000); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre
Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993).
79 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 426 (1960); Dorf, supra note 1, at 1272-73; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 78, at 509-10.

2014]

ANATOMY OF THE REASONABLE OBSERVER

1421

VII, noting both the necessity and the difficulty of using a
reasonable observer heuristic to determine social meaning in
that domain.80 Thus, the importance of the reasonable observer
construct—and of choosing the perspective from which social
meaning is judged—will likely persist as long as social meaning
is viewed to be constitutionally relevant.
In sum, though first conceived in the establishment
clause context, the reasonable observer has proven relevant in
numerous other domains. The lasting and pervasive influence
of Justice O’Connor’s reasonable observer means that it is
important to understand just what this heuristic is intended to
accomplish, what its shortcomings are, and whether it can be
improved by adopting some commentators’ proposed
modifications.81 Those questions are addressed in Parts II and III.
C.

Understanding the Injury

Before proceeding to the criticisms of the reasonable
observer, it is important to understand just what the harm is in
cases where a governmental message constructs a group as
inferior on the basis of religion (or race or sexual orientation).
Justice O’Connor hints at the nature of the injury involved
when she explains that religious endorsement tells “nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community” and sends a corresponding message “to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.”82 This description suggests that governmental
endorsement of religion causes “citizenship harms.”83
Speaking of racial stigma rather than religious exclusion,
Professor R.A. Lenhardt defines “citizenship harms” in terms that
are relevant to the endorsement test.84 “Focused more on
deprivation of intangibles such as ‘empathy, virtue, and feelings
80 Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three,
117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 582-83 (2003).
81 It is noteworthy that the reasonable observer has been used outside the
context of evaluating purely symbolic or semantic government action (such as erecting
displays or sponsoring prayer) for determining the social meaning of non-symbolic acts
(such as allocating funding for education). Admittedly, the notion that the social
meaning of non-symbolic government acts should be constitutionally relevant is
somewhat more controversial and difficult to defend. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 5, at
319; Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115,
155 (1992); Smith, supra note 5, at 286-89 (1987).
82 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
83 The term “citizenship harms” comes from R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding
the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 844 (2004).
84 Lenhardt, supra note 82, at 844.
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of community’ than on the denial of concrete political benefits like
the right to vote or serve on a jury, citizenship harms ultimately
go to what it means to be in community with others.”85
Citizenship harms hinder an “individual’s ability to belong—to be
accepted as a full participant in the relationships, conversations,
and processes that are so important to community life.”86
Numerous constitutional scholars have articulated the
concerns at the heart of the endorsement test in similar terms.
For example, Professor Neal Feigenson argues that concerns
about political standing—concerns that extend beyond the
concrete protection of civil rights—should be central to the
endorsement test.87 When the government endorses one set of
religious beliefs, it aligns itself with one group’s conception of
the good, thereby undermining full political participation.88 Even
more broadly, this sort of stigmatizing government conduct
undermines the equal status and respect to which each citizen is
entitled under the Constitution.89 Indeed, even those who accept
some “endorsing” government speech but draw the line at
“proselytizing” government speech fundamentally accept that the
government is prohibited from making religious minorities into
outsiders.90 We are keenly aware, as a nation, of the divisiveness
that results when the government plays religious favorites.91
A thorough explication of the nature and validity of
expressive harm is well beyond the scope of this article. My
goal is simply to show that both courts and scholars seem to
accept that a concern about what might be called “citizenship
harm” is at the heart of the endorsement test. Indeed, similar
harms may be relevant to other constitutional provisions, such as
the equal protection clause. Moreover, although citizenship harms
may be accompanied by more concrete harms, like discrimination
Id.
Id. Similarly, Professor Alan Brownstein describes the problem as
suggesting that religious outsiders are “guests” rather than core participants in the
community. Alan E. Brownstein, Prayer and Religious Expression at High School
Graduations: Constitutional Etiquette in a Pluralistic Society, 5 NEXUS 61, 78 (2000).
87 Neal R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of
Religion: An Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV.
53, 66-67 (1990).
88 Id. at 68-69 (“Once government makes religion relevant to political
discourse, some who are not members of the favored religion and who do not share
those conceptions will be marginalized: they will no longer feel that they can
participate equally in the formulation of policies, or will be perceived by others as less
worthy participants.”).
89 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 122-27 (2007); Norton, supra note 73, at 181-83.
90 See Dorf, supra note 1, at 1288-92.
91 Id. at 1291-92.
85
86
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or other “microagressions,”92 there is an increasing recognition
that such injuries to political status should be recognized as
constitutionally significant injuries in their own right.93
To summarize, the reasonable observer is here to stay.
Although the continuing vitality of the endorsement test itself is
by no means assured, the influence of the reasonable observer has
extended well beyond its origins in that test. The reasonable
observer has proved useful as a heuristic device for understanding
a variety of problems of social meaning. In particular, the
reasonable observer is one perspective from which it is possible to
judge whether government action can be understood to inflict
expressive injury, or “citizenship harms,” upon individuals.
II.

CRITIQUES AND ALTERNATIVES

The reasonable observer has been subject to extensive
criticism. One of the principal criticisms of Justice O’Connor’s
observer is that he is not a “real” person. This criticism really
consists of two separate claims: first, that the knowledge
imputed to the reasonable observer is not the sort of knowledge
that a real person observing a religious display would possess;
and second, that the hypothetical reasonable observer inevitably
reflects the biases of the judge and fails to take account of the
perspective of reasonable religious nonadherents. Each of these
criticisms will be considered in turn. The alternatives proposed
by various commentators will be described as well.
A.

The Omniscience Criticism

Justice O’Connor’s insistence on describing the
reasonable observer as being extremely knowledgeable has
subjected her heuristic to attack. According to Justice
O’Connor, the reasonable observer is acquainted with “the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the [law].”94 The
observer also knows the history and nature of the place where
a religious display appears and is familiar with religious
symbols and basic First Amendment categories.95 This
characterization led Justice Stevens to argue that this
“presumptuous” description of the reasonable observer turns it
Lenhardt, supra note 82, at 836-39.
Id.; see also Norton, supra note 73, at 175-81 (discussing the concrete
“behavioral harms” that may arise from government hate speech).
94 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985).
95 See supra Part I.A.
92

93
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into an “‘ultrareasonable observer’ who understands the
vagaries of this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.”96
Indeed, Justice Stevens’s opinion in Pinette points out that
“[r]easonable people have differing degrees of knowledge; that
does not make them obtuse, . . . nor does it make them
unworthy of constitutional protection. It merely makes them
human.”97 The reasonable observer is subject to criticism, then,
because he is not limited by the information that the average
viewer of the religious display would have.
Numerous commentators have echoed Justice Stevens’s
concerns. For example, Professor Steven Smith has pointed out
that “real human beings perceiving government actions often
do not have access to such extrinsic evidence . . . .”98 Similarly,
Professor Paula Abrams has criticized the reasonable observer
for “lack[ing] the one characteristic most significant to
Establishment Clause concerns—humanity.”99 She argues that
the reasonable observer’s “omniscient knowledge of government
purpose and action” causes his perspective to diverge from that
of the average passerby, and that this divergence is aggravated
if that passerby belongs to a religious minority.100 Moreover, in
his review of lower court applications of the reasonable
observer test, Dean Jesse Choper noted that the varying
interpretations of the reasonable observer’s mental state have
“generated a host of inconsistent rulings.”101 One important
criticism of the reasonable observer heuristic, then, is that this
hypothetical person seems to possess an indeterminate level of
knowledge, or at least a level of knowledge that far exceeds that of
the average community member or passerby. In addition,
Professor Abrams’s argument suggests that the hypothetical
observer’s omniscience tends to align him more with the

96 Capitol Square Rev. & Adv. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 807 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
98 Smith, supra note 5, at 293 n.109 (emphasis added).
99 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1538, 1547.
100 Id.; see also Susan Hanley Kosse, A Missed Opportunity to Abandon the
Reasonable Observer Framework in Sacred Text Cases: McCreary County v. ACLU of
Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 139, 162-63 (2006) (“[T]he
fiction of a reasonable observer requires the hypothetical observer to know much more than
an actual observer knows. Most observers will not know the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute, especially if the display is old.”).
101 Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability,
18 J.L. & POL. 499, 511-13 (2002); see also Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 20-21 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Strasser, supra note 17, at 710-11, 716-17.

2014]

ANATOMY OF THE REASONABLE OBSERVER

1425

government than with the typical religious nonadherent, thereby
sparking the second criticism: majoritarian bias.102
B.

The Charges of Inconsistency and Majoritarianism

The second criticism—that the reasonable observer
tends to embody the perspective of the majority, or of an
adherent of a majority (Christian) faith—is perhaps the more
important and powerful criticism.103 There are actually two
related versions of this argument, both of which assume that
the reasonable observer should be imbued with the
characteristics of a living, breathing human.104 The first version
simply states that the reasonable observer test is incapable of
consistent application because it does not indicate whether the
reasonable observer adheres to any particular faith. Because
religious views, along with other significant aspects of one’s
worldview, are likely to affect how individuals perceive
religiously charged symbols or government-sponsored conduct,
the argument goes, the test inevitably produces incoherence in
the doctrine.105 This version of the criticism does not directly
adopt a charge of majoritarian bias in the endorsement inquiry;
it is, however, often accompanied by the suggestion that, in the

102 Abrams, supra note 1, at 1547 (“[T]he objective observer is impregnated with a
comprehensive understanding of government action that inevitably shifts her perspective
away from that of a passerby, particularly a passerby from a religious minority.”).
103 See Jay D. Wexler, The Endorsement Court, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 263,
265 (2006) (identifying the “majority bias critique” as “the most persuasive criticism of
the endorsement test”).
104 See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 17, at 714 (attributing some difficulties to
the fact that “the Endorsement Test is not grounded in the actual reactions of
reasonable observers”).
105 See, e.g., Choper, supra note 101, at 511; Dorf, supra note 1, at 1334-35
(“[The reasonable observer] has a serious limitation as a tool for deciding what a
contested symbol or text means. We only need such a test for hard cases, but it is
precisely in hard cases that different people may reasonably ascribe different meanings to
the same symbol or text. There is no unique reasonable observer.”); Kosse, supra note
100, at 168 (“[D]efining the community ideal of reasonable behavior by the ‘collective
social judgment’ is impossible in a religious arena. An observer’s perception of what is
reasonable changes depending on whether that observer is an atheist, Buddhist, or a
Christian.”); Marshall, supra note 11, at 533-37 (arguing that the endorsement test’s
failure to specify “[w]hose perspective . . . should govern” leads to inconsistent and
unsatisfactory results); Strasser, supra note 17, at 707-09; Benjamin I. Sachs, Note,
Whose Reasonableness Counts?, 107 YALE L.J. 1523, 1526 (1998) (“[T]he O’Connor
formulation fails to resolve whether the observer will have the perspective of one in the
religious majority or religious minority, and whether the observer will have the
perspective of an adherent or a nonadherent of the religion on display. It is impossible to
amalgamate, or average, these perspectives into one ‘hypothetical observer.’”).
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absence of specific guidance, judges will tend to fall back on
their own predominantly majoritarian perspectives.106
A stronger form of this critique suggests that, by
avoiding the question of whether the reasonable observer
possesses a particular religious viewpoint, the Supreme Court’s
reasonable observer inevitably parrots the perspective of the
majority religion—broadly speaking, Christianity.107 Professor
Caroline Mala Corbin points to the Supreme Court’s
unsupported assertion that the word “God” is nonsectarian, as
well as to lower courts’ tendency to depict plaintiffs who object
to Christian displays as “troublesome and oversensitive,” to
argue that “the hidden norm” in cases challenging certain kinds
of religious speech “is a Christian perspective, or perhaps a JudeoChristian perspective.”108 At the same time, Professor Corbin
points out that courts and commentators generally ignore the
viewpoints of nonbelievers and other religious minorities.109
Similarly, Steven Gey has suggested that focusing on the
reasonable observer may further alienate religious minorities:
By employing an “objective observer” to decide questions of
endorsement, Justice O’Connor relays the message to religious
minorities that their perceptions are wrong; or, even worse, that
their perceptions do not matter. I can think of no more effective way
to “send[ ] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community.”110

I have espoused a similar version of this argument.
Drawing on speech act theory,111 I have contended that
106 See, e.g., Kosse, supra note 100, at 168 (“Since no collective social judgment
about religious matters exists, the tendency to analyze the cases based on the desired
outcome or a majority perspective is a real danger.”); Marshall, supra note 11, at 537
(arguing that a judge is likely to “assume the objective observer to be him or herself”
rather than use a particular objective test).
107 According to the most recent Pew Foundation survey, from 2007,
Christians represent 78.4% of the U.S. population, though no one denomination
constitutes a majority. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape
Survey, REPORTS (2007), http://religions.pewforum.org/reports.
108 Corbin, supra note 3, at 1585, 1587.
109 Id. at 1586.
110 Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REV. 463, 481 (1994) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)); cf. Primus, supra note 80, at 580-81 (arguing that
“[n]othing in the case law disciplines the inquiry into the reasonable observer’s
perspective” in race discrimination cases, and therefore “the Court is left to consult its
own intuitions about reasonableness[,]” leading to the view that the challenged
legislation “is deemed to express . . . the valuations as seen by mainstream whites, and
laws touching on issues of racial equality will stand or fall based on how they appear
from that perspective”).
111 Speech act theory is a branch of linguistic theory that focuses on the effects of
linguistic utterances rather than on the simple descriptive meaning of words. It is
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although the endorsement test correctly focuses on interpreting
social meaning to determine whether symbolic government
action disparages certain citizens on the basis of religious
belief, it almost inevitably falls into the trap of majoritarian
bias.112 This majoritarian bias derives from a broader social
context that inevitably shapes meaning and interpretation. For
example, the predominance of Christianity in American society
makes Christian symbols seem less jarring and more natural
than non-majority symbols.113 Christian symbols are therefore
less likely to be perceived as affirmatively endorsing Christianity.
Concern about the inherent majoritarian bias in the
reasonable
observer’s
perspective
has
led
numerous
commentators to suggest alternatives. Professor Norman Dorsen
and Charles Sims observe that, “whatever else it was intended to
do, the establishment clause was designed at least to avoid
having the government prefer one religion over another, not only
financially, but through intangible benefits or burdens.”114
Therefore, particularly in light of the courts’ countermajoritarian
role, they suggest that the question of whether an endorsement
exists should be judged “from the viewpoint of those who
reasonably claim to have been harmed.”115 Likewise, Professor
Caroline Corbin, drawing on an analogy to the reasonable woman
in sexual harassment law, advocates for a “reasonable religious
outsider” perspective.116 Not only does this perspective work to
counteract majoritarian bias and “blind perpetuation of Christian
privilege,” it more accurately reflects the underlying purpose of
the establishment clause—to protect religious minorities—and
properly vindicates the countermajoritarian role of the
courts.117 In a related context, Professor Dorf, in considering
constitutional challenges to other forms of constitutional
expression, argues that government actions claimed to create a
message of second-class citizenship should be subject to
heightened scrutiny “if some identifiable group of people

characterized by an emphasis on the contextual factors that give rise to a particular utterance’s
effects. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 485 (2013) (“The core idea [of speech act theory] is that we can
perform a variety of actions when we say things. . . . The action performed by an utterance can
be called its ‘illocutionary force.’”).
112 Hill, supra note 36, at 520-21.
113 Id. at 521-22.
114 Dorsen & Sims, supra note 3, at 859 (emphasis omitted).
115 Id. at 859-61.
116 Corbin, supra note 3, at 1597.
117 Id. at 1596 n.325, 1597.
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reasonably takes offense at” that message.118 Dorf, too, thus
suggests that the perspective of the “victim” is the relevant one.119
Avoiding the reasonable observer heuristic altogether,
some scholars have suggested other means of determining
what a particular religious display might mean. For example,
Professors Shari Seidman Diamond and Andrew Koppelman
suggest replacing the amorphous reasonable observer inquiry
with survey evidence on the meaning of a display, similar to
the sort of evidence used to determine consumer confusion in
Lanham Act cases.120 And Professor Jay Wexler proposes that
an Article I court comprising judges with diverse religious beliefs
should make determinations of whether particular symbols or
displays constitute religious endorsement to ensure consideration
of minority religious perspectives.121 For the reasons discussed
below, I argue that all of these proposals, while each adding
something valuable to our understanding of the reasonable
observer heuristic, still fundamentally miss the mark.
III.

REHABILITATING THE REASONABLE OBSERVER

The reasonable observer is not all bad—he’s just
misunderstood. It would not be wise to seek to replace the
reasonable observer with an alternative observer. Alternatives
such as the reasonable nonadherent have a number of flaws
and are unlikely to remedy the shortcomings of the reasonable
observer. Instead, courts should focus on developing legal rules
and devices for constraining the apparently free-form inquiry
into social meaning.
Thus, it is important to understand the reasonable
observer for what he is and what he is not. The reasonable
observer is a way of articulating the process of any interpreter
attempting to discern social meaning. He is not a stand-in for
actual members or segments of the community. In this light, the
reasonable observer heuristic, while perhaps still awkwardly
conceived, appears far less pernicious. At a minimum, concerns
about attributing too much or too little knowledge to the
reasonable observer fall away.
Dorf, supra note 1, at 1337.
Id. Dorf ’ s view is similar to my own in that he acknowledges the possibility
of multiple reasonable interpretations and gestures toward using presumptions as a
way to manage multiple meanings. Id. at 1336-38.
120 See
Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured
Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713 (2001).
121 Wexler, supra note 103, at 289-91, 304-05.
118

119
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However, concerns about majoritarian bias are not
addressed by this novel understanding of the reasonable
observer. I therefore propose a remedy for these concerns as
well. The solution to the problem of majoritarian bias is not to
create an alter ego for the reasonable observer, but rather to
constrain biases through presumptions, burden-shifting, and
other procedural techniques.
A.

Understanding the Reasonable Observer in Relation to
the Act of Interpretation

It is a mistake to expect the reasonable observer to
resemble a living, breathing human being. As Justice
O’Connor’s words mostly indicate, this was never the intent of
the reasonable observer heuristic. To expect the reasonable
observer to represent a real person with a particular range of
knowledge, beliefs, and experiences is to undermine the
heuristic’s fundamental purpose. Yet, critics of the reasonable
observer suggest that the main problem is the reasonable
observer’s failure to align with the actual observations of real
people. Instead, the problem with the reasonable observer is
that the interpretive inquiry under the endorsement test is
unconstrained by substantive and procedural rules, rendering
the quest for social meaning inevitably open-ended.
1. Interpretation and Intent
As Justice O’Connor stated in Lynch, the goal of the
endorsement test is to determine the social meaning of the
display at issue.122 This social meaning “is not a question of
simple historical fact.”123 Instead, she explained, it is “like the
question whether racial or sex-based classifications communicate
an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be
answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.”124
Therefore, the endorsement inquiry is not an empirical question
about how individual viewers would perceive a particular
government-sponsored display or practice; it is much more
abstract. For this reason, Justice O’Connor emphasized that
the endorsement test does not “focus on the actual perception of
individual observers, who naturally have differing degrees of
122
123
124

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 693.
Id. at 693-94.
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knowledge.”125 Instead, the relevant inquiry is a quest for what
might be called the “public meaning” of governmental acts.126
I therefore argue that the reasonable observer does not
represent particular members of a community, but rather the
act of interpretation itself—of determining public meaning.
Several things follow from this understanding, all of which help
to make some sense of the endorsement test and its current
shortcomings. First, when confronted with a textual or other
symbolic and communicative act, we do not discern meaning by
polling particular individuals for their views. Indeed, it is clear
that meaning is not an empirical proposition; a word or phrase
means what it means by virtue of participating in a system of
language, not because a majority agrees that it has that
meaning.127 As John Searle has memorably explained, when
someone states that the term “‘oculist’ means eye doctor,” she is
“engaging in a (highly complex) rule-governed form of
behavior”; she is “not reporting the behavior of a group but
describing aspects of [her] mastery of a rule-governed skill.”128
Or, as Wittgenstein explains, “To understand a language means
to be master of a technique.”129 Consequently, interpretation is
not statistical or empirical in nature; “the truth that in my
idiolect ‘oculist’ means eye doctor is not refuted by evidence
concerning the behavior of others.”130 Moreover, although “there
is nothing infallible about linguistic characterizations,” and
indeed, “speakers’ intuitions are notoriously fallible,” Searle
explains that errors in interpretation are “not . . . due to overhasty generalization from insufficient empirical data concerning
the verbal behavior of groups” but from incomplete mastery of
125 Capitol Square Rev. & Adv. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
126 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1512-13 (2000).
127 Of course, a word can be given a particular meaning within a particular
community or subgroup that differs from its standard meaning in the language. For
example, drug dealers might use code words whose meaning is not accessible to
individuals outside their group in order to make their conversations more difficult to
understand. But this simply suggests that the subgroup itself has adopted its own set
of language rules, and not that the term itself loses or changes its predominant
meaning simply because a certain percentage of individuals use it in a different way.
128 JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 12 (1969). Or, as Wittgenstein puts it, she is playing the “language-game”
(Sprachspiel). LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 4, para. 7
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 2001) (maddeningly explaining that he is using the
term “language-game” to refer to the methods by which children learn their native
language, as well as to “the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it
is woven”); see also id. at 33, para. 81, 68, para. 199.
129 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 128, at 68 para. 199.
130 SEARLE, supra note 128, at 13.
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the rules of the language.131 On this account, then, it should not
be troubling that the reasonable observer is not an actual
member of the community, or that his qualities do not correlate
to those of real—but fallible—observers or interpreters.
Second, when discerning the meaning of a particular
utterance, we must consider the nature of interpretation itself.
The act of interpretation is, in essence, the act of attempting to
discern the intent behind an utterance. This is achieved primarily
by looking to the context of the statement and using all available
clues to reach the best possible understanding of what a person
would likely intend by using those words or symbols.132
But it is important to understand exactly what this
posited relationship between intent and interpretation does
and does not imply. It does imply that whenever an observer or
reader engages in the act of interpretation she assumes that a
person constructed the utterance at issue intentionally, with a
particular idea in mind.133 It does not imply, however, that
there is always one clear intent that is accessible to both the
speaker and the interpreter, nor does it imply that the
subjective intent of the speaker somehow controls the “true”
meaning of the utterance. Rather, it is possible that the
speaker’s intent was not clear or singular or precise enough to
answer every interpretive question that the interpreter might
have. Thus, a speaker may not have intended to send a
message of exclusion to non-Christians in proclaiming, “Christ
is King, and those who disagree must repent or suffer eternal
damnation.” The speaker may not have even remotely
entertained any thought of non-Christians at all.134 But this
does not mean that no message of exclusion can possibly arise.
And at the same time, the speaker does not have a monopoly on
meaning: I might say, “I have to go to the park today” when I
really mean, “I have to go to work today.” If I misspoke, I may
have the opportunity to clarify my intention, but my initial

Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
133 As Searle explains, “When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to
be an instance of linguistic communication, as a message, one of the things I must
assume is that the noise or mark was produced by a being or beings more or less like
myself and produced with certain kinds of intentions.” Id. at 16.
134 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 286-88. Wittgenstein gives the following
example: “Someone says to me: ‘Shew the children a game.’ I teach them gaming with
dice, and the other says ‘That sort of game isn’t what I meant.’ Must the exclusion of
the game with dice have come before his mind when he gave me the order?”
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 128, at 28.
131
132
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sentence still referred to a place of recreation with grass and
trees, rather than a law school office.
Therefore, interpretation is always an act of
construction of a hypothetical intent that does not actually
exist and not a reconstruction of an actual intent that can be
unearthed and verified. As Stanley Fish explains, “[A]ll
communications are mediated. That is, communications of
every kind are characterized by exactly the same conditions—
the necessity of interpretive work, the unavoidability of
perspective, and the construction by acts of interpretation of
that which supposedly grounds interpretation,” including
intent.135 To restate in perhaps overly simplistic terms,
interpretation is the listener’s (or reader’s) act of
reconstructing the intent of the speaker (or writer). But the
intentions of one person are never entirely or directly
accessible to another person. Indeed, in many cases the
intentions may not even be accessible to the speaker. Even in
the context of a face-to-face conversation, where an interlocutor
can respond and ask for clarification, the intentions of the
speaker are still mediated by language, which is rife with
imprecision and potential for mistaken application of rules.136
Thus, even if the interpreter could somehow directly access the
precise thoughts inside the mind of the speaker, the interpreter
would still lack information necessary to answer the question
of what the speaker’s utterance means.
Of course, in the case of symbolic displays or the “social
meaning” arising from government conduct, the distance
between the speaker’s actual intentions and the listener’s
understanding is further increased because the speaker is
absent or not identifiable. But whatever the scenario, it is
important to recognize that interpretation is always a post-hoc
construction of intent—not the act of actually accessing
intent.137 Moreover, the inaccessibility of intent opens up the
possibility of a difference between the speaker’s original
intention and the objective meaning.
Thus, if we accept that interpretation is the act of using
the rules of language to reconstruct the intent of another, we
must acknowledge the possibility of “mistakes” on both ends of
the message—the receiver’s end and the sender’s end. Or, as
Justice O’Connor suggests in the context of governmental
135 STANLEY FISH, With the Compliments of the Author: Reflections on Austin
and Derrida, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 37, 43-44 (1989).
136 Id. at 43.
137 Id. at 43-44.
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expression, “If the audience is large, as it always is when
government ‘speaks’ by word or deed, some portion of the
audience will inevitably receive a message determined by the
‘objective’ content of the statement, and some portion will
inevitably receive the intended message.”138 In large part, this
occasional failure arises because language also depends on
convention (rules), which the speaker and hearer may or may
not have fully mastered or internalized.
The failure to receive the message that the speaker
intended might result from a mistake on the part of the
speaker or the listener. It may also result from the measure of
indeterminacy that the inherent flexibility and malleability of the
surrounding context bring to the interpretive inquiry.139 Finally, it
may result from the fact that intent is not always complete,
present, or meaningful in a particular context, even to the
speaker herself.140 All of this implies that “mistakes” are not
always actually mistakes—they are sometimes just the inevitable
result of the play in the joints of language. The rules are not
precise, and meaning cannot be made completely determinate.141
Thus, “[m]eaning is more than a matter of intention, it
is also at least sometimes a matter of convention.”142 Hence,
Justice O’Connor’s distinction between the intended meaning
and the meaning “actually conveyed”143 essentially corresponds
to the Gricean distinction between “speaker’s meaning” and
“sentence meaning.”144 As Professor Matthew Adler explained,
the speaker’s meaning is the meaning that the speaker intended
to convey, whereas “the sentence meaning of a linguistic
utterance is what the utterance conventionally communicates.”145
Thus, sentence meaning is fundamentally produced by social
and linguistic conventions.146
“Convention,” which is often synonymous with “context,”
can include a wide variety of requirements that are necessary
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Hill, supra note 36; see also Anderson & Pildes, supra note 126, at 1512-13
(describing various ways in which the meaning one intends to express may deviate
from the meaning one actually expresses).
140 See supra note 134.
141 See generally FISH, supra note 135, at 43-48 (elucidating Jacques Derrida’s
thesis that the capacity for linguistic failure is inherent in, and essential to the
functioning of, language itself).
142 SEARLE, supra note 128, at 45.
143 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
144 Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1384-96 (2000) (discussing Grice).
145 Adler, supra note 144, at 1394 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
146 Id.
138
139
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for an utterance to mean something according to the rules of
the language game. For example, in order for a sentence to
have meaning in English, words must be used in a particular
order. To give another example, the meaning of utterances may
be changed by the physical and social setting in which the
utterance occurs. If I say, “I’m climbing the walls,” the meaning
of that phrase will vary depending whether the physical context
is a rock climbing gym or a hospital room where I’ve been
recuperating for several weeks. Similarly, if I use the term
“queer,” its meaning may be determined in part by whether I am
homophobic, and therefore attempting to insult someone, or
homosexual, and reclaiming the term as my own.147 A Latin
cross erected by the Ku Klux Klan may have a different meaning
than a cross erected by a group seeking to honor World War I
veterans.148 Thus, the context includes not only the physical
surroundings, but also the identities of the speaker and listener.
Another example demonstrates the interaction between
intent and convention, or context. Imagine a beach, on which a
series of scratches has been made in the sand. To those who
speak only English, the scratches appear to be a mere pattern
of lines and dots and have no communicative content. Such
viewers might imagine that the scratches were made by some
natural phenomenon, or perhaps by a child or adult idly
scribbling with a stick in the sand in order to make a pretty
design. Perhaps to one who understands Arabic, however, the
scratches have meaning. Perhaps they read, “Keep our beaches
beautiful.” The Arabic reader would thus understand the
import of the phrase and would also most likely assume the
writer to have intended the reader to glean such a message. Of
course, the writer may have had no such intention; she may
simply have intended to show off her newfound skills in Arabic.
This example illustrates several facts about symbolic or
semiotic communication, particularly when the actual speaker
is absent. First, the speaker’s intended message will never be
received if the reader does not have a working knowledge of the
relevant linguistic conventions. A Latin cross, like the cross
erected in honor of the war dead in the Mojave Desert, will not
be understood as a war memorial if it is viewed by someone who
147 See, e.g., Judith Butler, Critically Queer, 1 GLQ: A J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD.
17, 18-23 (1993) (“But sometimes the very term that would annihilate us becomes the
site of resistance, the possibility of an enabling social and political signification: I think
we have seen that quite clearly in the astounding transvaluation undergone by ‘queer.’”).
148 Capital Square Rev. & Adv. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Salazar v.
Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
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does not know that the cross is a common memorial for the
dead.149 Second, a reader who has familiarity with those
conventions will interpret the utterance by using the available
information about those conventions to reconstruct the utterer’s
purpose or intent.150 Someone who knows the history of the cross
erected in the Mojave Desert is more likely to interpret it as a
war memorial rather than as a message from the Ku Klux Klan.
Third, the conventionally correct meaning—the sentence
meaning—does not always correspond to the utterer’s intent,
but this is not to say that the interpreter was incorrect to
derive that meaning.151 Indeed, the sentence “Keep our beaches
beautiful” is surely an exhortation to keep our beaches
beautiful, whether or not it was intended as such. At the same
time, meaning is not particularly dependent on the views of any
particular reader; the sentence will have meaning regardless of
whether there is an available reader who can understand Arabic.
Yet the interpretation does not stop there. “Keep our
beaches beautiful” may also be a political statement, or an
ironic one—again, whether so intended or not—depending on
the broader social context in which the utterance is made. For
example, if sometime after the sentence is written, a group of
picnickers comes along and leaves trash all around it, the
sentence takes on a shade of irony that it may not have had
when it was written. The meaning has escaped the speaker’s
ability to control it because the context in which it occurs has
changed. Of course, the interpreter’s biases—his views about
environmental protection and whether the current government
does enough to protect the beaches, for example—may also
color the interpreter’s understanding. Thus, the war memorial
in Buono may still signify an endorsement of Christianity in a
particular community such as the present-day United States,
because our troops are religiously diverse but the symbol
149 Cf. Buono, 559 U.S. at 707 (considering an establishment clause challenge
to a cross erected as a war memorial on federal land).
150 On this point, see Jamin B. Raskin, Polling Establishment: Judicial
Review, Democracy, and the Endorsement Theory of the Establishment Clause—
Commentary on Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 761, 763-67 (2001) (citing
Adler, supra note 144) (arguing that the focus of the establishment clause inquiry is
the “purpose” of government action, which roughly corresponds to “sentence meaning,”
or “the purposes that underlie and render meaningful the actual language of a public
enactment or policy itself”). Importantly, Raskin clarifies that the relevant issue is
purpose, understood as sentence meaning, and not the subjective intent of individual
legislators or government actors. Id.
151 Moreover, according to postmodern theory, the speaker’s intent is always
in an important sense inaccessible, so the act of interpretation is always a post-hoc
construction of purpose, never an actual discovery of purpose. For purposes of this
article, however, that argument need not be further examined.
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represents only one religion.152 This message of endorsement
may be the correct one, even if the cross was intended as a
universal symbol of remembrance.
In this way, the interpretation of those sandy scribbles
connects to our understanding of how we interpret a crèche in a
public park or a menorah on the steps of a government
building. If the menorah appears in a city that is majority
Jewish, it may be more likely to be understood by viewers as an
endorsement of Judaism by a government dominated by, or
politically captured by, that religious group. Indeed, Justice
Blackmun suggested as much in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
in which he noted that the city’s relatively small Jewish
population was one reason for rejecting the claim that it had
endorsed Judaism by erecting a menorah next to a Christmas
tree.153 Endorsement of Judaism may be the social meaning of
the menorah, whether it was so intended or not.
2. Interpretation and Knowledge
Of course, in deciding on a particular meaning for the
menorah, the interpreter will consider other factors such as the
size of the menorah and whether it is accompanied by other
symbols like a Christmas tree.154 If the viewer happens to be
familiar with basic principles of constitutional law, and
happens to know whether the menorah was sponsored by the
government or a private group, and happens to be aware of the
history of the physical forum as either a public or non-public
forum, that knowledge will of course further assist the viewer
in discerning whether the purpose behind its placement was to
endorse Judaism. The more the interpreter knows, the more
likely the interpretation will be correct.
This observation leads to one of the key contentions of
this article. If we understand the reasonable observer simply as
a stand-in for the interpreter of social meaning, then the
“omniscient” or hyper-knowledgeable quality of the observer
seems much less problematic. The more knowledge one brings
to bear on the act of interpretation, the better. If we
152 See Brief of the American Muslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs
Council, and the Muslim American Veterans Association, as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Salazar v. Buono, 2009 WL 2418469 at 15.
153 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 n.64 (1989) (opinion of
Blackmun, J.) (arguing that it is “distinctly implausible” to consider the menorah
sitting next to a Christmas tree to be an endorsement of Judaism, in part because
Pittsburgh had approximately 45,000 Jews out of a population of 387,000).
154 Id. at 614.
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understand the goal of the endorsement inquiry to be the
interpretation of meaning, then we are not concerned with how
a particular display might strike an uninformed passerby. We
are concerned with what the display means and therefore with
the message that the government has conveyed. The goal is to
achieve the best possible understanding of the purpose behind
the government’s acts in the current context.
One would not, after all, assume that the best
interpretation of a Victorian novel is likely to be achieved by a
reader who has no familiarity with the history of the period or
the conventions of the genre; nor would we think a statute is
better interpreted by someone with less understanding of its
subject matter than by an expert.155 At the same time, however,
the meaning of a Victorian novel to a contemporary reader is
not necessarily identical with what the author meant to convey.
Thus, for example, the novel Jane Eyre, published in 1847,
shocked nineteenth-century readers with its portrayal of a
strong, individualistic heroine whose romance crossed class
lines.156 To the uninformed modern reader (perhaps like the
average
twenty-first-century
high-school
student),
the
protagonist may seem a somewhat spunky but quaint and overly
prudish young woman. Yet, to a more informed reader, who is
aware of Victorian conventions but seeking to make sense of the
character for contemporary readers, Jane Eyre may be a novel
about the ways in which social conventions create two possible
perceptions of women, as either angels or monsters.157
Is the reasonable observer in establishment clause cases
merely a stand-in for the judge, then? Yes, and this is as it
should be. The judge is clearly the individual charged with the
act of interpreting the meaning of a display or practice under
establishment clause doctrine. Thus, to arrive at an accurate
conclusion, the judge should mobilize all available evidence and
knowledge and bring it to bear on the interpretive puzzle at
hand. Indeed, judges are familiar with the interpretive
exercise, because interpretation—of statutes, of common law

155 The assumption of expertise that extends to the interpretive act is part of
the rationale that leads courts to defer to agency interpretations of the statutes they
are charged with administering. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
156 CHARLOTTE BRONTE, JANE EYRE (Wordsworth Classics 1999) (1847).
157 For a classic feminist re-interpretation of Jane Eyre, see, e.g., SANDRA M.
GILBERT & SUSAN GUBAR, THE MADWOMAN IN THE ATTIC: THE WOMAN WRITER AND THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITERARY IMAGINATION 336-71 (1979).
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cases, and of constitutional provisions—is precisely what they
are trained and expected to do.158
This insight—that the reasonable observer should be
and is the judicial interpreter who benefits from having the
broadest possible range of knowledge—raises the question
whether anything should be excluded from consideration in
determining social meaning. Is true omniscience really ideal
position from which to make the judgment about meaning?159
Consider another, more relevant, hypothetical. The mayor
of a city has a nephew who is a budding artist. This nephew
paints an enormous canvas of a crucifixion. The crucifixion,
however, is not that of Jesus of Nazareth, but rather of a follower
of Spartacus, the slave who led a rebellion against the Roman
republic.160 The mayor hangs his nephew’s painting in a
prominent place in City Hall. Does the reasonable observer
view this painting as religious or historical?
If the reasonable observer has access to information
that the average passerby does not, what role should that
knowledge play in interpretation? In this scenario, as in the
case of Jane Eyre, the reasonable observer’s knowledge
undoubtedly assists that observer in understanding the actual
intent of the original author or actor (whether the mayor’s
nephew or Charlotte Brontë). But, as explained above, that
original, subjective intent is not necessarily the same thing as
the “meaning” of the cross, painting, or novel. Though the
crucifixion painter’s intended meaning may be clear, that
intent does not control the subsequent message sent by the
presence of the painting in City Hall. It may well signify an
endorsement of Christianity to the reasonable observer. But if
so, it is not because the reasonable observer is somehow
ignorant, but rather because the relevant question is what we
158 Thus, although it has factual elements, the social meaning of a display is a
question for the judge to decide, not a question for the factfinder. This is precisely
because, unlike reasonableness in tort law, social meaning is not a question of
empirical fact but rather of social fact. Judges commonly find social or legislative facts
in constitutional cases. See generally Dean Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of Legislative
Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966).
159 The related evidentiary issues are dealt with in greater detail infra, Part III.C.
160 For a real-life work of art depicting this crucifixion, see FEDOR ANDREEVICH
BRONNIKOV, CURSED FIELD—PLACE FOR EXECUTION IN ANCIENT ROME, CRUCIFIED
SLAVES (1878). Thanks to Ron Colombo for suggesting a version of this hypothetical. For
a similar (but less stark) real-life example, see Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1564 (9th
Cir. 1991) (addressing a constitutional challenge to a park full of religious statuary, some
of which was created by a sculptor who “was not a particularly religious man and was
adamant that the park not be used for any religious purposes” but who “picked biblical
characters to sculpt as he felt they best portrayed the ‘peace on earth’ sentiment”).
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would assume or believe the person erecting such a painting, in
the present cultural context, intended by doing so.
Therefore, it is necessary to get past the notion that a
text or display “means” what its author or creator “meant.” The
search for social meaning is always the (re)construction of a
hypothetical intention. It asks the question, “What would a
hypothetical person usually mean by using this set of symbols
in this way, in this context?” For this reason, it is important to
know, like the reader of Jane Eyre, the purpose for which we
are interpreting: is it to determine the novel’s meaning to
nineteenth-century readers or its contemporary relevance?
With respect to the crucifixion painting, it is not as important
to ask what the painter meant to convey so much as it is to ask
what the act of placing such an unattended and unexplained
painting is likely to signify in a particular cultural setting. The
problem, therefore, is not with the level of knowledge possessed
by the interpreter but rather with determining the relevance of
various aspects of the symbol’s context to the question the
interpreter is seeking to answer.
In sum, the criticism of the reasonable observer as
omniscient and therefore insufficiently human distracts us
from understanding the true purpose of the heuristic device. It
exists not to represent a particular kind of viewer but rather as
a way of asking what the social meaning of a display is in a
particular context. The problem is therefore not with the
reasonable observer’s level of knowledge but with determining
what is and is not relevant to the inquiry at hand.
3. The Reasonable (Wo)man Analogy
The fact that the reasonable observer is essentially an
idealized interpreter and a stand-in for the judge herself
distinguishes this heuristic from the reasonable person in other
legal contexts like tort law and sexual harassment cases.161
Justice O’Connor asserted in Pinette that the reasonable observer,
like the reasonable person in tort law, “is not to be identified with
any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable
things.”162 Instead, the reasonable observer, like the reasonable
161 See generally Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect,
111 HARV. L. REV. 445 (1997) (discussing and criticizing the reasonable person
standard in sexual harassment law).
162 Capitol Square Rev. & Adv. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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person, is “a personification of a community ideal of reasonable
behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment.”163
The analogy is not entirely apposite, however. Though
the reasonable observer is similar to the reasonable person in
that both are idealized, imaginary entities, the purpose of the
reasonable observer, which is focused on interpretation, is
different from the purpose of the reasonable person, who is a
stand-in for community moral judgment about the
appropriateness of particular behaviors. The reasonable
observer’s judgments are not statistical, empirical, or otherwise
derived from what a majority of people might do, as explained
above. In determining how a reasonable person—or a
reasonable woman, or a reasonable victim—would behave,
however, statistical evidence may be quite relevant.164 In
addition, if the average person’s knowledge of certain legal
standards or factual circumstances is limited, this limitation
would be relevant to determining reasonableness in tort law.
The reasonable person is not expected to be an expert in legal
or technical matters, but the reasonable observer does have
access to specialized knowledge. Finally, and relatedly, the
perspective of the reasonable person is employed by juries,
while the interpretive conclusions of the reasonable observer
are to be reached by judges, as a matter of law.
In one important respect, however, the reasonable person
does resemble the reasonable observer: both are likely to be
swayed by particular biases.165 As noted above, the context and
identity of the listener, no less than the speaker, affect the
message that is received from a particular utterance. In this
sense, then, it may make sense to turn to some alternate
mechanism for minimizing the role of bias in interpretation. As
discussed below in Part III.B., however, the primary
alternative—substituting an alternate observer in the place of
the reasonable observer—is not likely to solve the problem.
163 Id. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)); see
also Toni Lester, The Reasonable Woman Test in Sexual Harassment Law—Will It Really
Make a Difference?, 26 IND. L. REV. 227, 227 (1993) (describing the reasonable person as
“a mythical individual who is supposed to represent a composite of society’s highest
values. The reasonable person test purports to establish liability objectively by asking the
question: ‘What would the reasonable person have perceived in the same situation?’”).
164 See generally V. Blair Druhan, Note, Severe or Pervasive: An Analysis of
Who, What, and Where Matters When Determining Sexual Harassment, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 355 (2013) (using empirical evidence to demonstrate statistical differences
between men’s and women’s perceptions of behavior as sexually harassing); Alan D.
Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV 323, 371, 377 (2012).
165 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 161, at 465-71.
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The Reasonable Nonadherent and Her Kin

The most prevalent proposed substitute is known as the
reasonable nonadherent, according to which the judge should
simply assume the perspective of a non-believer and interpret
the display from that vantage point. This section outlines two
critiques of heuristic devices that have been presented as
alternatives to the reasonable observer. First, asking a judge to
assume the perspective of a religious outsider requires the
judge in most cases to engage in a form of role-playing or
sympathetic imagining for which she is most likely illprepared. It is not at all clear how a judge is expected to place
herself in the shoes of a person of a different religious faith and
interpret a particular governmental practice or symbolic
display from that vantage point.166 Second, it is not clear that
these alternate observers even address the actual problem of
majoritarian bias. The assumption of many critics appears to
be that individuals’ perceptions of religious displays are
affected by their religious beliefs. The available evidence tends
to indicate, however, that religious belief may not play such a
decisive role in discerning social meaning.
1. Judicial Empathy?
Even accepting that judges should adopt the perspective
of the “reasonable nonadherent” or some such similar
construct, it is not at all clear how they should do so. Those
urging judges to adopt these alternate perspectives appear to
expect judges to step into a role and to imagine seeing a display
through the eyes of someone different from themselves, despite
lacking all of the life experiences and cultural influences that
such a person would have. This seems to be an exercise in

166 Of course, this problem may afflict the “reasonable woman” of sexual
harassment law as well. As Anita Bernstein argues:

A male juror, judge, or labor arbitrator cannot easily apply the reasonable woman
standard. Although the standard implies that men and women are immutably
different and perhaps mutually uncomprehending . . . this factfinder is charged
with the task of somehow transcending these differences. If he uses women he
knows well as reference points (“How would my wife feel?”), he veers into
subjectivity and distinctions based on race and class. If he avoids this kind of
specific thinking, then he must resort to speculation, or some self-framed
variation on the reasonable man or reasonable person standard, or perhaps some
unauthorized research on the nature of women . . . .
Id. at 474.

1442

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:4

empathy—or perhaps something like empathy, but even more
difficult to explain and operationalize.
Indeed, though “empathy” itself is difficult to define, it
is often referred to as a sort of “perspective taking.”167 The term
“empathy” thus may refer primarily to a cognitive quality—
“the capacity to attribute thoughts, desires, and intentions to
others, to predict or explain their actions, and to posit their
intentions.”168 This is indeed a quality that judges and others
arguably should and do possess; it is not, however, the quality
involved in adopting the perspective of another person and
then applying that perspective in interpreting the social
meaning of a display. Instead, it seems judges are being asked
to enter into another person’s mind for purposes of interpreting
meaning—to imagine another person’s interior life just as that
person would experience it.169 Beyond understanding how
another person with particular characteristics might feel or
react in a given situation, adopting the reasonable nonadherent
perspective also requires the judge to engage in the act of
interpretation from that person’s perspective—more an
exercise in imagination than an act of empathy.
Even if judges are capable of occupying other minds in
this way, such an exercise is arguably just as amorphous,
unguided, and unconstrained as the exercise of interpretation
from the perspective of the reasonable observer. There is no
reason to think that judges are particularly well-suited to this task,
and it is unclear how they are to go about it in the first place.
Perhaps these commentators are really asking judges to adopt
some kind of presumption against majority-religious symbols; but if
that is the case, it is probably best simply to say so.
Indeed, recent research into the role cultural attitudes
play in shaping cognition gives further reason to be pessimistic
about the possibility of an “empathy fix” to the reasonable
167 Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1944, 1958
(2012); Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination,
Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 325 (2012).
168 Susan A. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9
(2011) (emphasis added). Scholars have also pointed out that empathy may have an
emotional component, which may or may not be properly mobilized in the act of judging.
Id. at 11-12; Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 167, at 325 (describing empathy as
“vicarious emotion”).
169 This is similar to the classic philosophical problem of “other minds.” See,
e.g., Other Minds, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. 2009) (“Were I able
to observe the mental states of another human being that would not mean that I did
not have a problem of other minds. I would still lack what I needed. What I need is the
capacity to observe those mental states as mental states belonging to that other human
being.”). Thanks to Cole Durham for pointing out this connection.
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observer conundrum. Writing with a somewhat different goal,
Professor Dan Kahan identifies a phenomenon that he calls
“cognitive illiberalism.”170 Cognitive illiberalism refers to the
phenomenon whereby individuals’ political and cultural biases
distort their understanding of empirical facts, such as the
riskiness of particular behaviors like gun ownership and drug
use.171 As Kahan explains, this cognitive illiberalism comprises
various kinds of cognitive failures or defense mechanisms. For
example, individuals engage in “identity-protective cognition,”
whereby they view more favorably evidence and arguments
that align with “positions associated with their group identity”
and “impute greater knowledge and trustworthiness and hence
more credibility to individuals from within their group than
from without.”172 Moreover, the more deliberative the thought
process, the more likely it is that individuals will engage in this
type of motivated reasoning.173 There is thus particular reason
to think this problem will afflict judges severely.
According to Kahan, cognitive illiberalism is both
pervasive and surprisingly intractable.174 It is intractable
partly because it is particularly hard to recognize in oneself.
Thus, he explains, “Social psychologists have documented that
persons readily, and correctly, discern that individuals who
hold factual beliefs different from their own have formed those
views to fit their group commitments.”175 But individuals
generally have enormous difficulty identifying the same
behavior when they themselves engage in it.176 Kahan refers to
this effect as “naïve realism,” because people are realists about
the effects of others’ identities and values on their beliefs but
see their own beliefs as objectively true and obvious.177
Kahan’s thesis focuses specifically on how individuals
view empirical facts. His core argument is that individuals’
group identities and predispositions unconsciously shape their
view of the underlying facts upon which legal rules are based.
170 Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115
(2007). Professor Kahan’s purpose is to evaluate the cultural influences on cognition of
risk in public policymaking and to suggest solutions to the negative effects of such
influences on accurate assessment of risk.
171 Id.; see also Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 107, 116-18 (2010).
172 Dan M. Kahan, Foreword, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
173 Id. at 21.
174 Kahan, supra note 170, at 130-31.
175 Id. at 130.
176 Id. at 130-31.
177 Kahan, supra note 172, at 22.
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Thus, to the extent that debates about criminal or
constitutional law turn on empirical and predictive facts about
the real-world impact of certain policies, an individual will
believe that her view of the ultimate legal issue is correct and
based on facts and that her opponent’s view is a bad-faith or
purely ideological view that ignores or misreads the facts.178
But the same model may be applied to one’s perception of social
meaning. Indeed, it could help explain why different courts
reach radically different conclusions when viewing the same or
similar displays, leading to the criticisms of inconsistency and
incoherence described above.179 To take a recent example, recall
Justice Scalia’s famous exchange with plaintiff’s counsel in
Salazar v. Buono, in which the ACLU attorney insisted that
non-Christians would feel marginalized by a war memorial in
the form of a Latin cross, because it would appear to honor only
the Christian war dead.180 Justice Scalia characterized that
assertion as an “outrageous” interpretation.181 Such an exchange
is a perfect demonstration of two individuals’ inability to see
their own interpretations as anything but based on clear and
obvious facts, and the other’s as simply disingenuous.182
178 Id. at 6-8; see also Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113
HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999).
179 See supra Part II.B. For example, in ACLU v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624
(6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Kentucky county courthouse
Ten Commandments display that it acknowledged to be “identical in all material
respects” to the Kentucky county courthouse display that the Supreme Court struck down
in McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d at 626. This and
other post-McCreary County cases are discussed in Kreder, supra note 2.
180 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-39, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803
(2010) (no. 08-472), 2009 WL 3197881; cf. Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored
Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalizations and Expedient Post-Modernism, 61
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2011).
181 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-39, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803
(2010) (no. 08-472), 2009 WL 3197881.
182 The entire exchange was as follows:

JUSTICE SCALIA: The cross doesn’t honor non-Christians who fought in the
war? Is that—is that—
MR. ELIASBERG: I believe that’s actually correct.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Where does it say that?
MR. ELIASBERG: It doesn’t say that, but a cross is the predominant symbol
of Christianity and it signifies that Jesus is the son of God and died to redeem
mankind for our sins, and I believe that’s why the Jewish war veterans—
JUSTICE SCALIA: It’s erected as a war memorial. I assume it is erected in
honor of all of the war dead. It’s the—the cross is the—is the most common
symbol of—of—of the resting place of the dead, and it doesn’t seem to me—
what would you have them erect? A cross—some conglomerate of a cross, a
Star of David, and you know, a Moslem half moon and star?
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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in overturning a grant of
summary judgment for the government in a challenge to a
Latin cross war memorial, stated that the district court
improperly discounted the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony about
the history of war memorials: “[T]he district court erroneously
branded [the expert’s] declarations as conclusory, ignoring the
detailed listings and historical analysis provided in the
record.”183 At the same time, the court noted disapprovingly that
“the district court accepted without comment the statements of
the government’s expert . . . who offered a number of wholly
conclusory statements without historical reference or supporting
facts.”184 The clearly divergent perspectives of the district court
and the court of appeals on whose historical evidence is
trustworthy (and whose is “conclusory”) appear to mirror the
phenomenon that Kahan describes.
2. Is Religion the Problem?
Even if it were possible to adopt another’s worldview, it
is not clear that the nonadherent’s perspective is necessarily
the most relevant for the judge to assume. In a recent empirical
study, Professors Gregory Sisk and Michael Heise conclude
that political ideology—and not religious belief—plays a
significant role in predicting how judges will decide establishment
clause cases.185 Their study of all establishment clause decisions
by federal appeals court and district court judges between 1996
and 2005 revealed that federal judges appointed by Democratic
presidents were 2.25 times more likely to uphold plaintiffs’
MR. ELIASBERG: Well, Justice Scalia, if I may go to your first point. The
cross is the most common symbol of the resting place of Christians. I have
been in Jewish cemeteries. There is never a cross on a tombstone of a Jew.
(Laughter.)
MR. ELIASBERG: So it is the most common symbol to honor Christians.
JUSTICE SCALIA: I don’t think you can leap from that to the conclusion that
the only war dead that that cross honors are the Christian war dead. I think
that’s an outrageous conclusion.
MR. ELIASBERG: Well, my—the point of my—point here is to say that there is
a reason the Jewish war veterans came in and said we don’t feel honored by this
cross. This cross can’t honor us because it is a religious symbol of another religion.
Id.

Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1112 n.12 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id.
185 Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An
Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 1201, 1261 (2012).
183

184
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establishment clause claims than Republican-appointed judges.186
They found that “no other variable—not the judges’ prior legal
positions, religion, race, or gender—proved consistently salient in
predicting the outcome of claims alleging that governmental
conduct crossed the supposed line ‘separating Church and State’
under the Establishment Clause.”187
These findings throw into question arguments claiming
that judges tend to find nonendorsement when they view a
government practice or display from a Christian worldview.
Clearly, such an assumption underlies arguments urging the
courts to adopt the perspective of the “reasonable religious
outsider” or the “reasonable nonadherent.”188 A similar intuition
underlies Professor Mark Tushnet’s statement that the result
in Lynch may have been different if there had been “a Jew on
the Court to speak from the heart about the real meaning of
public displays of crèches to Jews.”189 Likewise, Professor
Kenneth Karst has suggested that “[p]erhaps it is not wholly
accidental that the main dissenting opinions” in a case upholding
Hawaii’s Good Friday state holiday under the establishment
clause were written by non-Christian judges.190 Indeed, these
sorts of observations are quite logical and commonplace.
Nonetheless, to the extent that the judge and the
reasonable observer are one, it seems that the reasonable
observer’s politics would be more important than his religion. Of
course, it is possible that one’s politics correlate with one’s
attitudes toward the proper role of religion in society. If so, it
may be that this attitude helps determine one’s perspective on
the social meaning of religious displays and other forms of
religiously charged government conduct.191 But this is not the
same as saying that one’s perspective is determined by one’s
religion. It is therefore highly questionable whether urging
judges to adopt the perspective of a religious outsider would
have the intended effect, even if such a feat were possible.
Kahan’s findings, together with Sisk and Heise’s,
indicate that cultural and political preconceptions certainly
186 Id. at 1204-05. Though the study combined all establishment clause cases
and did not separate out cases in which judges applied the endorsement test as
opposed to another test (such as Lemon), the statistical significance of the correlation
between decision and ideology was particularly great for cases involving religious
symbols (p < .001). Id.
187 Id. at 1205 (emphasis added).
188 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
189 Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 50 REV. POL. 628, 651 n.31 (1988).
190 Karst, supra note 13, at 524.
191 E.g., Sisk & Heise, supra note 185, at 1230, 1243.
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affect judges’ perceptions of the displays they are supposed to
be interpreting with objectivity. At the same time, merely
making judges aware of this effect or asking them to change
their perspective is unlikely to have the intended effect.
Individual judges may genuinely believe they are being
objective, or even mindful of the outsider’s perspective, but
chances are great that they are not actually doing so.
C.

Turning to Law

The predominant critiques of the reasonable observer
have distracted us from the true problem at hand: how to
interpret the social meaning of a display in a way that is more
principled and consistent than existing approaches. This
section proposes some doctrinal modifications that could
improve the consistency of outcomes in cases involving
interpretation of social meaning. These proposed alterations
reflect the revised understanding of the reasonable observer
outlined above. They do not radically change the endorsement
inquiry; indeed, some courts may, consciously or not, already
apply the device in this way. But this understanding of the
reasonable observer is not uniform, and the small modifications
proposed here will regularize and clarify the doctrine. First, the
interpretive inquiry involved in these cases must be defined
with more precision. Second, evidentiary standards should be
relaxed but applied with a proper understanding of what is and
is not relevant to the endorsement question. Finally, courts
should make more aggressive use of presumptions and burdens
of proof in order to manage, and decide among, the inevitable
multiplicity of possible meanings involved in any difficult case.
1. An Interpretive Inquiry
The endorsement inquiry must be understood as an
interpretive inquiry just like the many other interpretive
inquiries in which judges engage. There is, however, one
important difference: in cases of social meaning, judges must
recognize, and learn to handle, the inevitable polysemy of such
displays. Symbolic displays almost always produce multiple
reasonable interpretations. There is not one reasonable
observer, but many.
The interpretive question must also be stated more
clearly. As described above in Part I, the question at the heart
of the establishment clause inquiry is whether the
governmental practice or display casts particular community
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members as outsiders based on their religious beliefs (or lack
thereof).192 But it is also important to recall exactly what the
inquiry into social meaning entails. The relevant question is
not what a particular government actor intended, but rather
what the governmental display or practice means in a
particular context. As such, the relevant question is what
purpose or intention we would reasonably understand the
governmental speaker to have when engaging in this practice
or sponsoring this display.193
This inquiry is, of course, fraught with difficulties. One
primary difficulty is that, although many meanings will always
be possible, judges will often tend to see the meaning that is
most aligned with their own identities, beliefs, or politics as the
self-evidently correct one.194 It seems that progress could be made
toward dealing with this problem, however, if courts were required
to recognize that, in most cases, there will be multiple reasonable
meanings for a religious display.195 This recommendation
recognizes the reality that meaning will be contested in almost all
such cases, given the complexities of the context, including the
various perspectives of the message’s “readers.”196 However, rather
than trying to assume one particular perspective on meaning—that
of the religious outsider, for example—the correct result can be
achieved by adopting a presumption against majority religious
symbols, as discussed below.

See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part III.A. Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit has occasionally
articulated the test in roughly this way, albeit in connection with the “purpose” prong
rather than the “effect” prong of the endorsement test. See ACLU v. Grayson Cnty., 591
F.3d 837, 856 (6th Cir. 2010) (considering “what the objective observer would have
understood the purpose behind the display to be” (emphasis omitted)). I take the
position here that the purpose and effect inquiries collapse into one when social
meaning is at issue.
194 Supra Part III.B.1; see also Laycock, supra note 180, at 1212 (“When
Justices and government lawyers defend government-sponsored religious displays by
claiming that the display is really secular, the argument is often rather conclusory. But
the response is often even more conclusory. ‘Just look at it. See! It’s religious.’”).
195 In Trunk v. City of San Diego, for example, the court “beg[an] by
considering the potential meanings of the” challenged symbol. 629 F.3d 1099, 1110 (9th
Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
196 My suggestion is also in line with Professor Kahan’s proposals for dealing
with motivated cognition—namely, “cultivation of judicial idioms of aporia,” by which
judges acknowledge openly in their opinions that some cases are complex and do not
permit straightforward answers; and “expressive overdetermination,” by which judges
recognize multiple social meanings, while still being required to choose one as the
correct one. Kahan, supra note 172, at 59-68; cf. Dan M. Kahan, et al., “They Saw a
Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV.
851, 898 (2012); Secunda, supra note 171, at 144-47.
192

193
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2. Evidentiary Concerns
As this article has already suggested, judges engaged in
the interpretation of social meaning have no choice but to
occupy the position of the reasonable observer. The fact that
the reasonable observer’s knowledge need not be limited should
mean that courts could be relatively relaxed in terms of the
evidence they consider. It is already common practice for courts
to hear expert testimony,197 to look outside the record to
understand the nature and significance of a particular symbol
within a religious tradition,198 to consider historical materials,199
and even to take some sort of judicial notice of the social
context in which the display exists.200 In so doing, it seems that
judges need not be, and generally are not, limited by the record
compiled by the parties before them. If they are engaging in a
judicial act of interpreting social meaning as a matter of law
rather than as a factual inquiry into adjudicative facts or
actual individuals’ perceptions, they need not rely on the closed
universe of litigation documents.
In addition to the extrinsic materials just described,
judges might take empirical studies or surveys into account.201
This is different, however, from saying that meaning can be
empirically determined or that such evidence should be
dispositive. Although no statistical study can or should
determine social meaning, it is nonetheless important for
judges to be made aware of differing understandings of social
meaning, particularly by those who are situated differently
from them. The views of nonadherents—even idiosyncratic
views—would be relevant, as they would simply provide more
197 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1564 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting expert
testimony submitted in a challenge under California Constitution to a public park full of
religious statuary); Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1112-14 (9th Cir. 2011).
198 See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616-17 n.65 (1989)
(citing Gilbert, The Season of Good Will and Inter-religious Tension, 24
RECONSTRUCTIONIST 13 (1958)); Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259, 264 n.3 (6th
Cir. 2000) (citing 15 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 470 (Mircea Eliade ed., 1987)).
199 See, e.g., Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1023-25 (10th
Cir. 2008); cf. Trunk, 629 F.3d at 1121 (noting that the city’s history of anti-Semitism
affected the way that the large Latin cross symbol would be perceived by the
reasonable observer).
200 See, e.g., ACLU v. City of Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d 845, 852 (N.D. Ohio 1998)
(“The sad part of this case is that two years ago, probably less than 10% of the residents
of Stow even knew that the city had a seal, and most likely only a fraction of those could
describe what was on the seal. Now, almost everyone knows that one quadrant of the seal
has a Christian cross. The issue has become very divisive to the community.”).
201 See, e.g., Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 120; Feigenson, supra note
87, at 94-101.
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information for the judge to use.202 Such information could be
introduced by means of expert testimony and affidavits, though
none of these devices, alone, would determine the outcome.
At the same time, relevance must be enforced. In
particular, courts must be careful to question the relevance of
evidence that goes to the actual, subjective intent of a particular
government actor, rather than the “reconstructed intent” that is
relevant to social meaning. Thus, for example, in ACLU v.
Grayson County, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the
government’s assertion that its Ten Commandments display—
which was essentially identical to the display struck down by the
Supreme Court in McCreary County v. ACLU—had the purpose
not to establish religion but to acknowledge history.203 Although
the dissent pointed out that the government actors made
numerous explicit statements indicating an exclusive focus on
finding a way to post the religious document in the courthouse,204
the majority deferred to the government’s own articulation of its
subjective purpose.205 Indeed, the court even acknowledged that
the county’s understanding of history was frankly inaccurate—
but then found this fact irrelevant.206 The court noted, for
example, that scholars have demonstrated that the Ten
Commandments did not, in fact, influence American law in any
meaningful way.207 In addition, the court noted the display’s
claim that the The Star Spangled Banner inspired the
Americans in the Revolutionary War, although the anthem was
not actually written until decades after the revolution.208 The
choice to ignore the inaccuracy of the historical claims made by
the county could only suggest that the court was concerned
with the government actors’ subjective intent or state of mind,
rather than the intent that an observer would impute to the
government’s actions. An individual may be mistaken about
history, but the reasonable observer would not accept false
202 See, e.g., Kunselman v. Western Reserve Local Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 931, 932
(6th Cir. 1995) (noting the district court’s consideration of affidavits describing how a
challenged symbol was understood).
203 ACLU v. Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2010). The display in
McCreary County was struck down because the Court found that it did not have a
secular purpose under the Lemon test. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859-69
(2005) (applying Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). In Grayson County, the
Sixth Circuit held that the display was not motivated by the same religious purpose,
and—reaching an issue not reached by the Supreme Court—held that it did not have
the effect of endorsing religion. Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d at 854-55.
204 Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d at 857-63 (Moore, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 849 (majority opinion).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 849 n.6.
208 Id.

2014]

ANATOMY OF THE REASONABLE OBSERVER

1451

historical assertions. If the social meaning inquiry is to be
taken seriously, then this sort of evidence should not be
considered by courts to be controlling.
3. Presumptions
Finally, rather than purporting to assume an outsider’s
perspective, judges dealing with cases demanding interpretations
of social meaning should use presumptions and burden-shifting
rules as a means of constraining the interpretive inquiry. If the
central concern of the establishment clause is the religious outsider
rather than the insider, judges can impose rebuttable
presumptions that government sponsorship of majoritarian
religious symbolism constitutes endorsement and place the burden
on the government to rebut such a meaning. To do so, the
government may use evidence of intent, expert testimony, religious
and historical treatises, and other relevant information about the
context.209 A successful rebuttal would shift the burden from the
government back to the plaintiff.
Presumptions can be invaluable to judges dealing with
difficult cases. They function as tie-breakers when evidence is
in equipoise. Presumptions allocate the risk of error to the party
that should bear it, according the substantive principles of law
that control the case. If the objective is to protect religious
minorities, it is only sensible to craft a presumption to guide
judges in close cases where meaning is disputable and disputed.
Indeed, judges dealing with religious display cases often
invoke evidentiary burdens and scrutinize the record to
determine whether a party has overcome those burdens. For
example, in the Grayson County Ten Commandments case, the
209 Indeed, the existing case law could be read to implicitly impose such a
presumption when the symbol is freestanding. Courts often strike down displays of majority
religious symbols when unaccompanied by other, secular or minority religious symbols. See,
e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-602 (1989) (striking down standalone
crèche display); ACLU v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 634 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), suggests the unconstitutionality of standalone Ten
Commandments monuments). I have argued elsewhere for a rebuttable presumption against
religious symbols on government property, Hill, supra note 36, at 539-44. Similarly, Justice
Stevens has advocated for such a rule. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 650 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708
(2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Capitol Square Rev. & Adv. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 797 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Finally, Professor Stephen Feldman has
recommended the adoption of presumptions in certain establishment clause contexts in
order to counteract favoritism toward religious insiders. Stephen M. Feldman,
Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the
Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 267-71 (2003). This article, however, refines and
further develops the theoretical underpinning for that recommendation.
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court emphasized that “those objecting to a display . . . bear the
burden of producing evidence sufficient to prove that the
governmental entity’s secular purpose is a sham, and that an
objective observer would understand the display to be motivated
predominantly by religion.”210 Of course, the plaintiff already
bears the burden of proof in a constitutional challenge. But the
existence of multiple reasonable meanings in most cases
suggests that a rebuttable presumption in favor of one of those
meanings would better serve the goals of the endorsement test
and help judges choose correctly among them. Thus, if the court
determined that multiple reasonable meanings were possible, it
should credit the view that reads a majoritarian symbol as
sending a message of exclusion.211 This presumption flows from
the fact that judges will otherwise tend, in most cases, to evince
a majoritarian bias in interpreting the display. The
government would still be free, however, to rebut the presumed
message—for example, with powerful evidence of the symbol’s
nonreligious (historical or cultural) significance.212
Such a presumption can also act to counter the
motivated cognition described by Kahan. If a judge is inclined
to see only one meaning as obvious and true, putting a weight
on the scale in favor of the “outsider” meaning may well
counteract that inclination to some degree. Of course, there is
the possibility that these techniques would not solve the
problem entirely. Presumptions are easily manipulated and
may, themselves, be difficult to administer or become mired in
conceptual difficulty. But they would impose at least some
constraints on the interpretive inquiry.213 Moreover, moving the
doctrine toward a more legalistic one might move judges’
operative presumptions from the level of unconscious bias to

Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d at 856.
This proposal is similar to Professor Dorf ’s: he advocates in favor of a
presumption of “multiple reasonable perspectives,” suggesting that “if some identifiable
group of people reasonably takes offense at what it regards as a government message of
second-class citizenship, then the challenged government act, symbol, or statement
is . . . subjected to some form of heightened scrutiny.” Dorf, supra note 1, at 1336-37.
212 See, e.g., Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 2008);
Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991).
213 Sisk & Heise, supra note 185, at 1249-53 (urging more rule-like structure
for establishment clause cases as a means of ensuring that the inquiry is less freewheeling and the decision-making less politicized). For example, a per se rule against
religious displays on public property, though perhaps excessively inflexible in this
context, would surely constrain judges in many cases. Cf. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v.
Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting disagreement with the
state of the law but nonetheless applying a relatively straightforward rule requiring a
health exception in abortion regulations).
210

211
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the level of open debate. If so, the ideal of reasonableness could
only be better served.
CONCLUSION
The reasonable observer heuristic is in need of reinterpretation—not as a stand-in for a flesh-and-blood member
of the community, but rather as a way of understanding the
process of discerning social meaning. This article contends that
a proper understanding of the objective observer, along with a
recognition of the potential pluralism of social meaning and a
more robust deployment of legal rules and mechanisms, will
assist in stabilizing the inquiry, which has been criticized
repeatedly as biased and incoherent.
In particular, this article has argued that the reasonable
observer heuristic is fundamentally misunderstood by courts and
scholars who urge that the reasonable observer should take on the
characteristics of real human being. Properly understood as a
representation of how the act of interpretation occurs rather than
as a hypothetical standpoint from which to judge a religious
display, the reasonable observer becomes a helpful starting point
for operationalizing the task of interpreting social meaning.
Criticizing the reasonable observer for his failure to replicate the
qualities of actual human beings and suggesting that courts should
identify a replacement observer have led us down the wrong path.
Several things flow from this proper understanding of the
reasonable observer. First, this understanding focuses the
endorsement inquiry on the act of interpreting social meaning. It
asks whether the display at issue may be understood, in its present
physical and social context, to send a message of religious
hierarchy, or of social, cultural, or political exclusion based on
religion. Importantly, this is a question about reconstructed intent
of a hypothetical government speaker—it is emphatically not a
question about the subjective intent of any particular individual or
even composite speaker. Second, this revised understanding
suggests that a broad range of information and evidence may be
considered, but also that the evidence must be considered in light of
the inquiry just described. Thus, for example, evidence indicating
the “true” intent of the governmental actors is not likely to be
highly relevant, and it certainly is not dispositive. Finally, the
possibility of multiple meanings and the potential for majoritarian
bias mean that courts should use burdens of proof and
presumptions in a way that helps to control the otherwise freewheeling inquiry into social meaning.

